In recent years the topic of corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence about the determinants of corruption at the micro level. Therefore we explore in detail the impact of political interest using three different proxies. Furthermore, investigation of the effects of political interest on corruption has been neglected in the present literature. We address this deficiency by analyzing a cross-section of individuals, using the World Values Survey to explore the determinants of corruption using not only perceived corruption as a dependent variable, but also the justifiability of corruption. In addition, we present empirical evidence at both the cross-country level and at the within country level. The results of the multivariate analysis suggest that political interest has an impact on corruption, when controlling for additional significant factors such as institutional conditions (e.g., voice and accountability).
I. INTRODUCTION
Research into corruption is an area that has strongly expanded in the last couple of years as an increasing number of studies explore the causes and consequences of corruption at the international level. However, most of these studies explore corruption at the macro level while only a limited number of studies have started to investigate the determinants of corruption at the individual level (see, e.g., Mocan 2004 , Swamy et al. 2001 , Torgler and Valev 2006 . This empirical study seeks to shed some light on the determinants of corruption by working with an individual data set that covers a broad number of countries. We analyze a cross-section of individuals using the World Values Survey wave III (1995 III ( -1997 using the perceived corruption and the justifiability of corruption as dependent variables. .The major aim in the paper is to investigate whether political interest affects corruption. To check the robustness we are working with several different proxies of political interest, namely discussion intensity, interest in politics and importance of politics in life. Despite the increasing interest of economists in the determinants of corruption, the link between political interest and corruption has not yet come under intense empirical investigation.
The use of micro-data sets will afford more insights into the corruption literature. One of the major advantages of such data sets is that a broad set of countries can be investigated.
However, drawing conclusions from such a large data file might be problematic because institutional and cultural frameworks that typify specific countries might influence corruption: such features cannot always be controlled in a satisfactory manner. Thus, this paper also provides within country evidence focusing on Switzerland. Analyzing Swiss data is interesting because Switzerland's institutions are not homogeneous. The degree of institutionalized political participation rights varies strongly between the 26 Swiss cantons.
To summarize, this paper provides five innovative aspects: 1) it explores the relationship between political interest and corruption using three different proxies of political interest. Previous studies have neglected to explore that aspect. There are some studies that discuss the impact of education, but without considering the impact of political interest or informal education. 2) While we observe a large number of studies at the macro-level, we only observe a limited number of micro-level studies. Mocan (2004) , for example, stresses:
"because corruption data are available only at the aggregate (country) level, existing research has focused on explaining the cross-country variation in corruption. Two exceptions are Swamy et al. (2001) and Svensson (2003)" (p. 2) . 3) Most studies at the macro level focus on the perceived level of corruption without considering the willingness to bribe (justifiability of corruption). In our study we explore both aspects in detail. The willingness to accept the instrument of corruption allows investigation of the social norms of compliance in a society.
4)
We not only provide cross-country evidence at the micro level, but also explore the robustness of this evidence by focusing on a country that has a certain level of institutional variation. 5) We explore additional interesting factors such as trust in institutions, voice and accountability and democratic participation rights.
Before considering these findings in detail, however, Section II aims to outline our theoretical approach. Section III then presents the empirical findings and Section IV finishes with some concluding remarks.
II. POLITICAL INTEREST
Political interest influences the mechanism through which individuals go about collecting, processing, and interpreting political matters. Rose-Ackerman (1999) stresses that a government may operate with impunity if no one bothers to analyze the available information.
To a certain extent, political interest leads to better supervision and awareness of the administration and governance performance. Thus, political interest may also lead to stronger public awareness among citizens. An increased knowledge possibly augments the ability to acquire information at lower costs which in turn increases the individual incentive to be informed and to discuss political issues. Hence this process acts as a sort of "multiplier effect". Rose-Ackerman (1997) stresses that corruption can be limited "by outside pressure from the public" (p. 143). It therefore generates a higher level of transparency among the overall population due to the better awareness of governance and administration performances. The more citizens are informed, the better they are in the position to monitor and control politicians. Thus, the political process become less complex which leads to a reduction of the costs of discussion.
Discussion allows for an exchange of arguments and enhances group identification.
Furthermore, the interaction in a face-to-face situation gives citizens the opportunity to identify others' preferences. As others' preferences become visible, the moral costs of freeriding or behaving illegally increase, which has a negative effect on the justifiability of corruption. If political discussion is common in a society, citizens are confronted with arguments from both sides, those favoring and those opposing a certain political outcome, and this increases the overall level of information. Additionally, citizens become involved, and feel responsible for the result which may create a sense of civic duty and a higher willingness to comply. Thus, discussion provides the opportunity to clarify benefits and costs of political issues and thus increases co-operation among group members. This enhances the human capital in political matters. Mocan (2004) stresses that a higher level of human capital reduces the tolerance of corruption.
Studies have found that an individual's political interest contributes to the possibility that he will be involved in the political process (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) . Political interest becomes an important explanatory factor in models of political behaviors from political sophistication (Carpini and Keeter, 1996) to voting (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady, 1995) . Kuenzi (2006) has shown empirically that civic education (non-formal education in his paper) has a significant positive impact on political participation. This kind of education can be seen as the result of an informal process that is not necessarily a part of an individual's formal education. However, people have to spend energy, time and money to become informed (cost of informal education). People therefore will decide whether to have political interest by comparing the costs and benefits of it. In our case, we can argue that people balance the cost of having political interest with the benefit from controlling and reducing corruption, when faced with the consequence of corruption. To illustrate this aspect we first employ a simple model that allows illustration of the relationship between political interest and the level of corruption.
A Simple Model
We will first explore a general model of bureaucrats' dishonest behavior. Let us assume that there are individuals engaged in production, who receive the same incomes: w. A bureaucrat is responsible for the provision of a public good through a production process requiring a certain infrastructure. The cost of the public good, namely c, is financed with income taxes.
We assume that the bureaucrat is able to set the tax rate. So she/he has the motivation to be corrupt or if individuals do not know the actual cost of the public good or their true tax burden. The bureaucrat can set a higher tax rate and divert the difference (noted by b) between tax revenue and the expenditure on the public good (the economic rent), into her/his pocket.
Alternatively, the bureaucrat can take advantage of this situation by extorting a payment in exchange for the correct tax assessment. However she/he will be punished with a fine m if his corruption is detected. Klitgaard (1988) , for example, reports that tax inspectors in the Philippines would assess an unrealistically high payment on the taxpayer. The legal framework meant it was very costly and time-consuming to appeal and in many cases the taxpayer was unsure of their exact liability. Such a corruption is called extortive corruption.
Bureaucrats have discretionary power in the application of rules in order to extract a rent from the private agent in the form of a bribe (Brunetti and Weder 2003) . To avoid the loss from corruption, workers have to invest resources to control such a behavior or to complain or not accept corruption. Political interest may help to identify an illegal treatment and may reduce the willingness to accept bribes showing a stronger incentive to take action against this kind of corruption. Political interest may provide the foundation for doing something against corruption even when the costs of appealing are very high or the formal mechanisms of internal and external control are no working well. An uninterested individual may consider themselves better off by surrendering to the extortion. Thus, political interest may substantially reduce the costs of fighting extortive corruption. By showing a higher willingness to use instruments for voicing complaints and to threaten the political support for a government, the politically interested individuals may find channels to reveal such corrupt behavior or at least raise the costs of illegal behavior for the bureaucrat. Political information reduces the information costs and therefore reduces the constraints on potential complaints and puts pressure on the government and the bureaucrats to act in the public interest. This is especially important in countries where there is a lack of other means in constraining bureaucrats and politicians. Informal education helps individuals to understand what they should expect of a legitimate government. Rose-Ackerman (1999) points out that groups and individuals have effective avenues for challenging official actions. Although policies that enhance accountability and openness "are likely to be more acceptable to democratically elected leaders, these reforms can also have an effect in undemocratic systems whose leaders nevertheless need public support to retain power" (p. 144). However, it can be criticized that the government could stonewall until the protest groups have exhausted their energy and resources (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Bureaucrats could anticipate such a behavior and neglect such threats.
Investing in political information requires time and resources as is connected to the opportunity costs. We identify such information costs as e. We also call e informal education.
Such costs may not be independent of living expenses l.
Dynamic Game
Maintaining the generality of the analysis, we consider the simplest case where a person deals with the bureaucrat in a democracy. Furthermore we assume that their utilities equal their revenues.
The timing of the model is as follows: the individual first decides whether or not to invest in controlling the bureaucrat through political information and political interest comprising their informal education (E or NE), then the bureaucrat selects to be corrupt or not (C or NC) according to the individual's decision. We therefore make use of a standard gametheoretic concept of equilibrium. Obviously the individual has to give up informal education when w-c-e < l. In this circumstance, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is (NE, C), namely (w-c-b, w+b), which means that such an individual will have no incentive to monitor the bureaucrat.
We then analyze the interesting case where w-c-e > l. There are two possible subgameperfect Nash equilibriums.
(E, NC), namely, (w-c-e, w) if e < b; 
Individual
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We can find that an individual will have political interest so long as the cost of relevant informal education is not very large. In this case corruption will be controlled as a consequence.
Implications
First of all, we have to emphasize the premise of the model is that both the individual and the bureaucrat are in a democratic regime. Individuals will have higher costs of monitoring the bureaucrat in a dictatorial regime. Thus, in a democratic society, political interest may work more strongly towards reducing corruption. However, it should be noted that we will control for the level of accountability when conducting the empirical analysis..
The results imply that individuals will invest in informal education as long as e < b. It means individuals will have political interest in monitoring the bureaucrat if the participation cost is not very large. Under these conditions, the best strategy of the bureaucrat is remain honest. Thus, in such a condition the political interest of individuals will help to minimize the level of corruption.
Measuring Political Interest
We will use several proxies of political interest to investigate this main hypothesis and therefore to check the robustness of the results. First of all we focus on the discussion intensity using the following variable: Values Survey see www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
Dependent Variables
Our dependent variables are perceived corruption, and the justifiability of corruption.
To assess the level of perceived corruption from the WVS, we use the following question:
How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?
Almost no public officials are engaged in it (1) A few public officials are engaged in it (2) Most public officials are engaged in it (3) Almost all public officials are engaged in it (4) The justifiability of corruption is measured with the following variable:
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: (...) someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties (1=always justified, 10= never justified).
The interpretation of this question is that a higher value leads to lower justifiability of corruption. This variable can be seen as a proxy for social norms of compliance (see Torgler   2007 ). The variable justifiability of corruption can be criticized as it considers a self-reported and hypothetical choice (see Swamy et al. 2001) . It can also be argued that an individual who has engaged in corruption in the past will tend to excuse such a behavior by declaring a low justifiability of corruption. Furthermore, cross cultural comparisons should be treated with some caution. In countries where corruption is widespread and delays in transactions are long, additional payments to "speed up" the process may be justifiable. De Soto (1989) and his research team conducted an experiment, setting up a small garment factory in Lima, with the aim of complying with the bureaucratic procedures and thus behaving in accordance with the law. He reports that 10 times they were asked for a bribe to speed up the process and twice it was the only possibility to continue the experiment. However, a higher justifiability of corruption leads to a stronger incentive to delay the transactions in order to acquire more additional payments. Justifiability is also correlated with most other corruption measurements being statistically significant at the 0.05 level but with lower r values compared to perceived corruption (TI (r= 0.358), the ICRG (r=0.187, not statistically significant), the Quality of Government rating (r=0.380), and perceived corruption (r=-0.421)).
We will use a weighted ordered probit estimation to correct the samples and thus to get a reflection of the national distribution. In the estimations where we pooled several countries dependent and independent variables integrated in the estimations 5 . Furthermore, Sweden could not be included as one of the control variables (education) has been coded differently.
Independent Variables
When exploring the correlation between political interest and corruption one has to take into consideration that other characteristics affect corruption, which need to be controlled for to better isolate the impact of political interest. Thus, we control for the education level, the marital status, political trust, institutional conditions, religiosity, risk attitudes, the economic situation and the employment status.
a) Education
To better isolate the importance of political interest, it highly relevant to control for formal education. The variable education 6 (continuous variable, 1=low, 9=high education) is related to citizen's knowledge about corruption. Better educated individuals are supposed to know more about government's activities and thus would be in a better position to assess the degree of corruption. This may have a positive or a negative impact on the justifiability of corruption and the perceived corruption, depending on how governments act. On the other hand, they may be more strongly involved in corruption, understanding better the opportunities of corruption. Thus, the effect of education is not clear and there is a lack of empirical studies that investigate the correlation between education and corruption. Swamy et al. (2001) , for example, disregard the variable. Mocan (2004) found that a higher level of education leads to a higher probability of being targeted for bribes stressing also that a more educated population is expected to be less tolerant of corruption.
b) Age
A limited number of studies have included age in their estimations. Swamy et al. (2001) consider age as a control variable in their estimations of the justifiability of corruption and find a positive but non-linear effect. The authors, focusing on gender differences, did not comment on this result. Mocan (2004) also uses micro data to show an effect of age on corruption: individuals at the age of 20 to 54 are more likely to be asked for a bribe compared to the reference group (younger than 20). Torgler and Valev (2006) explore the impact of age on corruption, differentiating between the same cohorts over time (age effect) as well as the same age groups in different time periods (cohort effect). The paper observes a consistent age effect, while a cohort effect is less obvious. There are two major concepts that explain the correlation between age and crime: the traditional desistance theory and the age theory. The desistance theory asserts that the decline in crime occurs because factors associated with age reduce or change the actors' criminality. On the other hand, the age theory asserts that the decline cannot be explained by a change in the persons' status or the exposure to anti-criminal institutions, which act to restrain offenders. The theory is based on the idea that the aging of the organism itself has an impact on individuals' criminal behavior (for an overview see ). Evidence about gender differences can also be found in helping behavior (see, e.g., Eagly and Crowley 1986) or ethical decision making (Ford et al. 1994 , Glover et al. 1997 and Reiss and Mitra 1998 .
The criminology literature provides one of the best sources for observing possible gender differences. Mears et al. (2000) report that men commit more offenses than women age "at every age, within all racial or ethnic groups examined to date, and for all but a handful of offense types that are peculiarly female… sex differences in delinquency are independently corroborated by self-report, victimization, and police data, and they appear to hold crossculturally as well as historically" (p. 143). Torgler and Valev (2007) find strong evidence that women report a lower justifiability of committing illegal activities than men. The results remain robust after investigating different time periods and extending the specification with several opportunity factors such as education, employment status or income.
d) Marital status
Marital status is a further control variable (dummy variable, value 1 if the respondent is married). Married people may be more compliant than others, especially compared to singles because they are more constrained by their social network (Tittle 1980) . It is also argued that marriage alters public behavior (Swamy et al. 2001) . Tittle (1980) found significant differences between the different marital statuses, with the greatest evidence for the singles, followed by the separated or divorced. However, controlling for age, the results show that the association between deviance and marital status was a reflection of age difference, as older persons are more likely to be married or widowed and age was a strong predictor concerning the deviance. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) also point out that the literature on crime finds that marital status does not seem to have an impact on the likelihood of crime.
e) Economic situation
As a proxy for income we use the economic situation of an individual (dummies upper class, middle and lower class are in the reference group). Using the exact income would produce biases, because of difficulties comparing this variable across different countries. Individuals with a higher income are more likely to be asked for a bribe, as are those with a better education. Individuals with a lower income might have lower social "stakes" or restrictions but are less in a position to take risks, because of a high marginal utility loss (wealth reduction) if they are caught and penalized.
f) Occupation status
Another variable is the occupation status as it affects whether the respondent is in a position to benefit from corruption (see Swamy et al. 2001 ). We will use a dummy variable for selfemployed individuals as they might be in the best position to invest in bribing and benefit from corruption. Such a status may have an impact on the norms regarding bribery.
g) Risk attitudes
We are going to include a dummy variable that measures risk aversion 7 . Individual willingness to behave illegally could also be a function of risk attitudes. Prior survey studies rarely controlled for risk attitudes. Risk aversion reduces the incentive to act illegally.
Furthermore, controlling for risk attitudes allows for better insights regarding the variables of age, gender, or economic situation. It could be argued that the observed difference between women and men or between different age groups is influenced by different risk attitudes functions.
h) Urbanization
Mocan (2004) stresses that in larger cities the extent of bribery may be higher due to the fact that economic activities are larger and vary in scope which leads to an increased contact with the government. Moreover, government officials may be less personal compared to those in smaller cities which may reduce the opportunity costs of bribing. We use town size as a proxy for urbanization. 8 i) Religiosity 7 Now I would like to ask you something about the things which would seem to you personally, most important if you were looking a job. Here are some of the things many people take into account in relation to their work. Regardless of whether you're actually looking for a job, which one would you, personally, place first if you were looking for a job? 1. A good income so that you do not have any worries about money 2. A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment 3. Working with people you like 4. Doing an important job which gives you a feeling of accomplishment And what would be your second choice? A dummy variable was built with the value 1, if someone has chosen 2 as first or as second choice. 8 V232. Size of town: 1. Under 2,000 2. 2,000 -5,000 3. 5 -10,000 4. 10 -20,000 5. 20 -50,000 6. 50 -100,000 7. 100 -500,000 8. 500,000 and more.
Religiosity might influence people's habits and might be a restriction on engaging in illegal activities (Torgler 2006 It is important to control for this variable to better check the impact of political interest.
Individuals with a lower level of political trust might be frustrated and therefore less interested in following politics.
k) Voice, Accountability and Democratic Rights
Similarly, we also control for institutional conditions. In particular, it is important to control for citizens' opportunity to translate their political interest into political actions; in other words 9 Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never. (7 = more than once a week to 1 = never or practically never). 10 Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (4= a great deal to 1=none at all). 11 Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government in your capital: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (4= a great deal to 1=none at all). 12 Could you tell me how much confidence you have in parliament: Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of confidence to 1=no confidence at all).
whether they have a meaningful 'voice' in influencing the state (e.g., through voting processes). It helps to see how strong political interest can affect corruption, holding such institutional conditions constant. If the government tries to generate trust with well functioning institutions, co-operation can be initiated or increased. Furthermore, when citizens are satisfied with the way they are treated, the co-operation is enhanced. In general, the greater 'voice,' all other things equal, the lower we would expect corruption to be. If the government is not benevolent, such instruments have the potential to control politicians' discretionary power. Not only can voter control help limit the abuse of political power by selfish politicians, when citizens cannot completely foresee incumbents' preferences the elements of direct democracy can also empower citizens with an instrument for controlling the government. Such control has an ex ante effect on policy formulation by elected incumbents in that they must always take into account possible voter intervention. Levi (1988) points out that a possible consequence of creating or maintaining compliance is to provide reassurance by the government. A government that precommits itself with democratic rules imposes self-restraints on its own power and thus sends a signal that taxpayers are seen as responsible persons. Furthermore, direct democratic rules signal that citizens are not ignorant or uncomprehending voters, which might create or maintain a certain social capital stock that should also affect the justifiability of corruption.
In the cross-country study we use Kaufmann et al. (2003) variable VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY for the year 1996. The variable measures the political process, civil liberties, and political rights of a country. In the within country investigation we are going to use an index of the degree of direct democracy developed by Stutzer (1999) and applied in papers such as Stutzer (2000, 2002) , Feld (2002), Torgler (2005) , Schaltegger and Torgler (2007) . The index reflects the extent of direct democratic participation (1= lowest and 6= highest degree of participation) at the cantonal level.
l) Regions
We will also control for regional differences considering the dummies CEE and FSU (Central Eastern and Former Soviet Union countries), LATIN AMERICA, ASIA and AFRICA 13 , in the reference group WESTERN EUROPE + USA + AUSTRALIA). It can be assumed that there are regional differences in the perceived corruption and justifiability of corruption. We expect a lower perceived corruption in the reference group countries, based on a historical high level of rule of law and accountable systems of governance. A lack of such important factors may also lead to a higher justifiability of corruption. (8) in Table 2 indicates that an increase in the political discussion scale by one unit reduces the probability of reporting the highest level of corruption by 1.6 percentage points.
Empirical Results
International Evidence
While we observe that political interest matters, we cannot observe a statistically significant correlation between education and our two dependent variables (showing in both cases a negative sign). Thus, informal education seems to be much more important than education. This finding suggests that it is important to generate "political human capital" rather than just generalized human capital.
Interestingly, we observe that voice and accountability reduces the justifiability of corruption and the perceived level of corruption. The coefficient is highly statistically significant in all specifications while also reporting large marginal effects. Thus, the findings indicate that a more legitimate and responsive state is an essential factor for a lower level of corruption. Similarly, political trust has a negative impact on the justifiability of corruption and the perceived level of corruption. The joint role played by political trust can be investigated using a Wald-test for coefficient restrictions to test for joint significance. In all cases we can observe that the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning that the political trust variables play a significant role in the determination of countries' corruption level. Trust in the legal system provides the most consistent result in all the tables. Thus, trust at the constitutional level seems to be more important than trust at the current politico-economic level. The marginal effects are quite substantial, particularly for the perceived corruption regressions.
Looking at the other variables we observe that all age groups from 30 to 65+ have a significantly lower justifiability of corruption than the reference group below 30.
Interestingly, we can observe that the marginal effects increase consistently with an increase of the age group. However, looking at the variable perceived corruption, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant with marginal effects varying between 2.2 and 4.9
percentage points and increasing with age. Thus, the level of perceived corruption decreases with an increase in age. Furthermore, the results also indicate that there are gender differences. Being female rather than male increases the probability of a person stating that accepting a bribe is never justifiable. This indicates that women have different norms regarding bribery than men. However, the perceived corruption coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that women perceive corruption to be more widespread than men. Moreover, married people are more sensitive to the social norm regarding bribery than individuals with another marital status. However, the coefficient is only statistically significant for the estimations with justifiability of corruption as the dependent variable. We observe that being in a higher income class leads to a lower justifiability of corruption and surprisingly, we also observe a negative correlation when focusing on perceived corruption.
Self-employed people are more tolerant towards corruption and perceive corruption to be more common. Being risk averse is correlated with a lower justifiability of corruption. The coefficient is statistically significant in all the regressions. On the other hand, we don't observe a statistically significant relationship between perceived corruption and political interest. In line with our expectations we also observe a negative relationship between urbanization and justifiability of corruption and a negative between urbanization and perceived corruption. The results also show that church attendance is enforcing the norm of compliance. The correlation between church attendance and justifiability of corruption is positive, although the coefficient is not always statistically significant and the marginal effects are not that large. Not surprisingly, we find strong regional differences. The probability of inhabitants of CEE and FSU, Latin America and Africa 14 countries stating the lowest justifiability of accepting a bribe is lower than for the reference group. Thus, the findings show that the social norm regarding bribery is unambiguously higher in Western Europe, USA and AUSTRALIA. We also observe that the reference group has the lowest perceived level of corruption.
In sum, the estimation results presented in Table 1 to 6 suggest that political interest matters, controlling in a multivariate analysis for additional factors. This is consistent with the theoretical part developed in Section II. It is interesting to observe the importance of political trust and voice and accountability in this context.
Causality
The causality direction of our main hypothesis can be criticized. One can argue that higher level of perceived corruption may lead to frustration and therefore to a lower willingness to be informed. Similarly, a higher justifiability of corruption may induce individuals to be less interested in what happens in politics, although the causality problem may be more severe when focusing on individuals' perceived level of corruption. Thus, to evaluate the direct effect of political interest on corruption it is useful to investigate any potential causality problems through use of an instrumental variable technique. We present in Table 7 six 2SLS estimations providing also detailed diagnostic tests to check the robustness of the results. For simplicity and due to less causality problems we will work with the second regression in the previous tables. The results remain robust when considering a broader specification. In the first three specifications we focus on the justifiability of corruption and the last three on the 14 As mentioned, Africa only covers the country Nigeria. This explains why in some regressions Africa is longer reported (variable not collected this survey indicates that the models are identified and that the instruments are relevant. The AndersonRubin test is also statistically significant. In all the cases, this test fails to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. Thus, the 2SLS specifications also provide support that political interest matters.
Within country evidence
In general, drawing conclusions from cross-cultural comparisons is difficult because not all features specific to a country can always be controlled in a satisfactory manner. Thus, we extend our study, focusing on within country data from Switzerland at the state (cantonal) level to investigate the impact of tax morale and institutional quality. As mentioned previously, analyses of Swiss data are interesting because Switzerland's institutions are not homogeneous. The degree of institutionalized political participation rights varies strongly between the 26 Swiss cantons. In line with the previous regressions, we are going to investigate the third wave. This is the latest available data set for Switzerland as the country has not participated in the fourth wave. justifiability of corruption. We also observe the tendency that trust in the legal system matters, particularly when focusing on the perceived level of corruption. We have only included this political trust variable in the specification as it had the strongest impact on corruption in the previous six tables. In addition, it allows us to avoid a decrease in the number of observations.
As in the previous approach, we also observe that age, gender and marital status (being married) matter for justifiability of corruption. Risk attitudes on the other hand are relevant when focusing on the perceived corruption rather than on the justifiability of corruption.
Similarly, urbanization and self-employment status are not relevant at all. Moreover, religiosity is only relevant when focusing on perceived corruption. It is also worthwhile to note that there was no significant relationship between income and political interest in Switzerland. Finally, in line with the previous findings we observe overall that formal education is less relevant than informal education or political interest. The coefficient is only statistically significant in Table 9 and the marginal effects are below the values found for political interest. Thus, here we find additional support that human capital is mainly relevant in a specialized form.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In recent years the topic of corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence about the determinants of corruption at the micro level. To check the robustness we have explored the relationship between political interest and corruption using three different proxies of political interest. The results clearly indicate that it is not enough to explore human capital with an education variable. A further strength of the paper is to focus not only on the perceived level of corruption, as is mainly the case in the literature, but also to consider the justifiability of bribery. Moreover, we have provided crosscountry and within country evidence at the micro level, controlling for the level of institutional conditions that are relevant when focusing on political interest, namely voice and accountability and direct democratic rights.
The econometric estimates also suggest that the perceived corruption and the social norms regarding bribery is higher in the reference group (region Western Europe, USA and Austria) compared to CEE and FSU countries, Latin America, Asia and Africa.
All in all, the results have some interesting political implications. Increasing people's interest in politics may help to reduce the level of corruption, which would benefit society controlling for country's voice and accountability. The results also suggest that it may be important to place more emphasis on institutions that enhance voice and accountability and democratic participation rights. This helps to increase individuals' social norm and perception of compliance. Thus, the presented results in this paper mirror those in previous studies and underscore the importance of accountability as an essential aspect for the efficient functioning of a government and the existing institutional architecture. However, understanding how corruption can be reduced and how government can foster political interest remains a fruitful field for further research. 
Marg. Coeff.
Marg.
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Marg. Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a) Political Interest
Notes: In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE, LOWER MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASS, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, RISK TAKER, WESTERN EUROPE + USA + AUSTRALIA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest score (10, never justifiable). The higher the value the lower the justifiability. CEE: Central Eastern European Countries, FSU: Former Soviet Union Countries.
Table 2
Perceived Corruption and Political Discussion
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a) Political Interest
